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Closing America’s Enormous Fiscal Gap: Who Will Pay? 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Adam N. Michel 
 
The United States is in horrific fiscal shape. The current difference between the present value of 
projected future government spending (including official debt service) and the present value of 
projected future taxes—a difference known as the infinite horizon fiscal gap—is $210 trillion. 
This paper will show that closing the true fiscal gap with uniform tax increases, either 
now or in the future, will have significant distributional effects. Depending on when taxes are 
raised and what the levels and composition of resources are, lifetime tax rates will vary 
significantly. For example, a household with two 30-year-old working parents could experience a 
spending decrease of between one and close to three years’ salary over the parents’ lifetime, 
depending on their income level. 
 
Background 
The fiscal gap is calculated over the infinite horizon for a good reason. Due to what economists 
call the labeling problem, the government deficit—the annual difference between expenditures 
and taxes—is not well defined. Consequently, the official debt and the finite horizon measures of 
the fiscal gap are unreliable for assessing fiscal sustainability. The data used in forming the 
infinite horizon fiscal gap are from the July 2014 release of the Alternative Fiscal Scenario 
(AFS) published by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).1 
                                                
1 The AFS is CBO’s forecast of what future taxes and spending will look like under the reasonable assumptions that 
Congress and the administration will continue to change laws through time in order to maintain current policy. In 
short, the AFS is what CBO thinks the United States is facing, absent a truly dramatic and sustained shift in fiscal 
policy. See The 2014 Long-Term Budget Outlook (Congressional Budget Office, July 2014), https://www.cbo.gov 
/publication/45471. 
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The labeling problem is easy to understand. The government is free to label monies it 
takes from the public as either taxes or borrowed monies. And it is free to label monies it gives to 
the public as either transfer payments or debt service. What is ultimately registered on the 
government’s books as official liabilities (public debt) is a matter of linguistics, not economics. 
Indeed, as shown in Green and Kotlikoff (2006), any economic model with rational agents, no 
matter the imperfections in its markets or the nature of its government policies, suffers fully from 
the labeling problem. 
What this means, in concrete terms, is that official reports of past and current government 
debt and deficits, as well as official projections of future government debt and deficits, simply 
reflect the choice of language or labels by government accountants. The freedom to use different 
internally consistent labeling conventions (words) produces entirely different past, current, and 
projected levels of government debt and deficits. 
The only way to measure a government’s true net fiscal liabilities without the impact of  
economically arbitrary choice of language is to form the government’s present value fiscal gap 
measured over the infinite horizon. This measure is label free (i.e., any internally consistent 
labeling of future government expenditures and receipts will produce the same fiscal gap); 
however, it will involve entirely different time paths of the government’s cash flow (taxes less 
spending) and, thus, the government debt and deficits. 
In contrast to measuring words, the infinite horizon fiscal gap measures fiscal policy 
(specifically its sustainability) on a label-free basis. Stated differently, the measurement of the 
infinite horizon fiscal gap will be the same no matter what a government chooses (via word 
choice) to put on and keep off its books, provided the government’s fiscal labels are internally 
consistent. The US government has a long-standing practice of using language to keep most of 
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its liabilities off the books. This is why its $210 trillion fiscal gap completely dwarfs its $13 
trillion official debt. 
How large is $210 trillion in actuality? It is 12 times the current US GDP and 16 times 
what the United States deigns to report as its official debt. It also represents 10.5 percent of the 
present value of all future US GDP. Hence, one way to cover all future government spending 
commitments in excess of what can be paid for by all future taxes is to collect the equivalent of 
10.5 percent of the GDP more in taxes each year from now through the end of time. Doing so 
would require immediately and permanently raising all federal taxes—including personal income 
taxes, corporate income taxes, excise taxes, and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 
payroll taxes—by 58 percent. 
The requisite 58 percent tax hike is higher than the 57 percent tax hike needed a year ago, 
which was discussed in Kotlikoff (2013). This tax hike increase is a result of the fiscal gap rising 
by $5 trillion over the past year, primarily because tens of millions of baby boomers are now one 
year closer to receiving, on average, what will be $40,000 (in today’s dollars) in Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid benefits.2 
Since the fiscal gap measures the United States’ true indebtedness,  the United States’ true 
deficit was $5 trillion last year and not the roughly $500 billion official deficit being routinely 
discussed by CBO and, therefore, the media. The focus on an economically meaningless measure 
of fiscal condition is not innocent. No member of Congress is prepared to advocate publicly an 
immediate and permanent 58 percent tax hike. Nor is any member of Congress ready to support a 
cut in all federal spending (apart from servicing official debt) by 38 percent, starting today and 
continuing forever. For that type of spending cut is the alternative to raising taxes. 
                                                
2 Figures are from the authors’ calculations, based on CBO’s June 2014 Alternative Fiscal Scenario. 
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On this score, Congress is joined by the administration. Neither the current administration 
nor any previous postwar administration has been willing to acknowledge publicly the United 
States’ true fiscal condition. Economists, however, are determined to do so. More than 1,200 
economists (including 17 winners of the Nobel Prize in economic sciences and representatives of 
every top economics department) have endorsed the Inform Act at www.theinformact.org. This 
bipartisan bill mandates fiscal gap and generational accounting by CBO, the Government 
Accountability Office, and the Office of Management and Budget on an annual basis and for 
major fiscal initiatives. 
 
Uncle Sam’s Zero-Sum Game 
Paying for what the government spends is a zero-sum game. Yes, there are ways to use fiscal 
reforms to improve economic efficiency and, potentially, to stimulate the economy in the 
short run. But no efficiency gains or demand- or supply-side magic will resolve the $210 
trillion fiscal gap. Instead, either current or future generations will need to pay. The timing 
and structure of the tax increase will determine who foots the bill—the young, the old, the 
rich, or the poor. 
This study examines the impact that across-the-board tax hikes necessary to resolve the 
fiscal gap will have on different generations of rich, middle-class, and poor households. 
Specifically, this study assesses the effects of three different tax scenarios aimed at closing the 
fiscal gap on three age cohorts in five income brackets. 
Laurence Kotlikoff’s 2013 paper calculates how much revenue or spending cuts would be 
needed if Congress were to enact reforms at different times in the future. Table 1 is a summary 
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of these findings.3 The table shows that delaying reform only increases the size of tax increases 
or benefit cuts needed to close the gap. This paper will model the lifetime tax burdens of three 
age cohorts under both the immediate 57 percent tax increase and the delayed 69 percent tax 
increase associated with reforms that begin in 2033, as demonstrated in table 1. The calculations 
in this paper will begin in 2014, so a 20-year delay (comparable to the 20-year delay found in 
table 1) will begin in 2034. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of Revenue Increases or Spending Cuts Needed to 
Eliminate the Fiscal Gap for Different Adjustment Starting Years 
Start	  year	   Revenue	  increase	  (%)	   All	  noninterest	  spending	  cuts	  (%)	  
2013	   57.0	   37.0	  
2023	   63.2	   40.2	  
2033	   69.3	   43.0	  
2043	   75.9	   46.3	  
Source: Laurence Kotlikoff, “Assessing Fiscal Sustainability” (Mercatus Research, Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, December 2013). 
 
The Impact of Closing the Fiscal Gap on Five Stylized Households 
To illustrate the impact of different changes to the federal tax rate, this study has modeled three 
age cohorts of 30-, 45-, and 60-year-old married couples. Each cohort has four different fixed (in 
real terms) levels of annual labor income: $12,500, $50,000, $250,000, and $1 million. This 
study also models rich, non-working couples at these three ages. Each couple has $25 million in 
initial assets at age 30. 
                                                
3 If the tax hikes eroded the various federal tax bases by discouraging economic activity, marginal and average tax 
rates would have to rise even further, potentially leaving the United States with the highest tax rates of any 
developed country. 
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Couples with the first two labor income levels have roughly the annual incomes of the 
average of the first and third quintiles of nationwide income. The couple with $250,000 in labor 
income represents the average income of the 80th to 99th income percentiles. The $1 million-
income household falls within the 99th to 99.9th percentile. Finally, the couple with $25 million 
in assets falls within the 99.9th to 100th percentile of the overall income distribution.4 
For each couple, the study compares the following scenarios: the total, as well as 
personal, taxes paid under the existing federal income tax (EFT), the EFT with an immediate and 
permanent 57 percent increase, and the EFT with a delayed and permanent 69 percent increase 
starting in 2034. The 57 percent tax increase and other tax hikes considered in this study are 
based on 2013’s fiscal gap because the new fiscal gap measure was not available at the time the 
calculations were made. The model will show average lifetime tax rates, defined as the ratio of 
the present value of the total taxes to the total resources (the present value of future labor 
earnings plus holdings of current assets). Finally, the study will model three tax cases for three 
age cohorts in five income brackets, providing 45 cases to consider. 
 
Modeling Lifetime Tax Payments 
To calculate lifetime taxes under the four tax scenarios, this study relies on Economic Security 
Planner (ESPlanner).5 In the course of finding a household’s annual spending targets, ESPlanner 
makes highly detailed calculations of annual taxes that a given household will pay to federal and 
state governments over the rest of its members’ lives. In this analysis, the focus is purely on 
                                                
4 The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2011, Congressional Budget Office, 2014, http://www 
.cbo.gov/publication/49440. 
5 ESPlanner is a lifetime financial planning program developed by Kotlikoff’s company, Economic Security 
Planning, Inc. The program determines how much households should spend and save each year to achieve a stable 
living standard per household member. Calculating spending is important for understanding future taxes. The 
amount of money people save each year affects how much they spend. This then determines their assets and income 
in each future year, and asset income affects tax liabilities. See www.esplanner.com. 
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federal taxes, so it is assumed that the households are in a state with no state income tax. 
Additionally, for simplicity’s sake, we ignore estate and gift taxes under the three tax systems. 
In modeling the EFT, this study assumes that the $12,500-income couple saves nothing in 
tax-deferred retirement accounts, the $50,000-income couple saves 5 percent of earned income 
per working year in such accounts, and the $250,000- and $1 million–income couples contribute 
to retirement accounts at the maximum elective deferral limit of $17,500 per year. The $25 
million-asset couple is unable to make tax-deferred retirement account contributions because it 
has no earned income. 
All these couples retire and begin receiving Social Security benefits at their Social 
Security full retirement ages. Social Security benefits are assumed to continue to be based on the 
current definition of covered earnings. 
The 30-year-old couples have two children, ages two and zero. When the children are 
between the ages of 19 and 22, the couples spend the following on college tuition per year, per 
child: $0 for the $12,500-income couple, $7,500 for the $50,000-income couple, and $60,000 for 
the $250,000- and $1 million–income couples and the $25 million-asset couple. For the 45-year-
old couples, these children are ages 17 and 15. 
The $12,500-income couple has a house valued at $70,000. The $50,000-, $250,000-, and 
$1 million–income couples have houses valued at three years’ income. The $25 million-asset 
couple has a house worth $6 million. Each 30-year-old couple has a 30-year, fixed mortgage at 5 
percent interest for 80 percent of the value of the house. Property taxes are 1.5 percent of the 
value of the house, and homeowners insurance is 0.3 percent of the value of the house. The 45-
year-old couples have 15 years remaining on each mortgage, with a balance equal to that of the 
corresponding 30-year-old couples when they reach 45 years of age. 
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Calculating Lifetime Tax Rates 
We assume that corporations earn, on a nominal basis, a 10 percent annual return before paying 
any taxes. Under the EFT, corporations are assumed to pay a 7.3 percent nominal rate of return 
on their investments to households.6 Stated differently, households are, in effect, able to deduct 
the payment of corporate taxes from their personal asset income. This is because households face 
taxes not on the 10 percent earned by corporations but on the 7.3 percent they receive directly or 
indirectly after corporations pay their 27 percent marginal tax. 
Under the immediate and permanent, across-the-board, 57 percent federal tax increase, 
both income and FICA taxes are increased by 57 percent. Corporations are then assumed to pay a 
5.76 percent nominal rate of return on their investments to households.7 The increased federal 
taxes on corporate profits decrease the nominal rate of return for both regular and retirement 
assets. Said another way, when corporate profits are taxed at a higher rate, investments that rely 
on capital gains and dividends will be lower because investment returns necessarily come from 
after-tax profits and higher taxes mean less profit. 
Under the delayed and permanent, across-the-board, 69 percent federal tax increase, both 
income and FICA taxes are increased by 69 percent in 2034. The nominal rate of return on 
                                                
6 The 7.3 percent nominal rate of return equals the assumed 10 percent corporate nominal rate of return times 1 
minus our assumed effective marginal corporate income tax rate of 27 percent (7.3 percent = 10 percent × [1 − 
0.27]). In a recent study located at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231640, Duanjie Chen and 
Jack Mintz estimate the effective marginal US corporate tax at 35 percent. Katarzyna Bilicka and Michael 
Devereux (2012), on the other hand, recently estimated a 23 percent effective US corporate tax rate. The two 
studies use somewhat different definitions of the tax rate. Chen and Mintz incorporate state corporate taxation, 
which this analysis ignores. Bilicka and Devereux make somewhat different assumptions in measuring effective 
marginal US tax rates. In reviewing these two studies, 27 percent (an average of the two rates) appears to be the 
best current measure. 
7 The 5.76 percent nominal rate of return equals the assumed 10 percent corporate nominal rate of return times the 
total of 1 minus our assumed effective marginal corporate income tax rate of 27 percent times one plus the 57 
percent tax increase (5.76 percent = 10 percent × [1 − 0.27(1 + 0.57)]). 
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regular and retirement assets is assumed to remain at 7.3 percent and then, in 2034, decrease to 
5.44 percent.8 
The results assume that 75 percent of the post-corporate tax investment income is 
received by households in the form of long-term capital gains or qualified dividends and is taxed 
as such. The remaining 25 percent is taxed as ordinary income. The resulting asset income taxes, 
however, are then reduced by half to accommodate the deferral of capital gains and dividends, as 
well as the complete avoidance of capital gains and dividend taxes by passing on appreciated 
assets at death.9 
In order to compare all taxes paid under the three tax policy scenarios, this study imputes 
annual corporate taxes paid on behalf of households. To do so under the EFT, each household’s 
total regular and retirement assets are multiplied by the real discount rate, 6.796 percent, and the 
assumed average marginal corporate tax rate of 27 percent.10 Under the immediate and 
permanent 57 percent tax increases, each household’s total regular and retirement assets are 
multiplied by the real discount rate, 6.796 percent, and then by the total of the assumed average 
marginal corporate tax rate of 27 percent times 1 plus the 57 percent tax increase: 
[0.06796][(0.27)(1.57)]. Under the delayed tax increase of 69 percent, years 2014 to 2033 are 
computed using the EFT formula, and years 2034 to 2083 are computed in the same manner as 
the 57 percent increase but with the new, higher increase of 69 percent: [0.06796][(0.27)(1.69)]. 
 
                                                
8 The 5.44 percent nominal rate of return equals the assumed 10 percent corporate nominal rate of return times the 
total of 1 minus our assumed effective marginal corporate income tax rate of 27 percent times one plus the 69 
percent tax increase (5.44 percent = 10 percent × [(1 − 0.27)(1 + 0.69)]). 
9 These assumptions were chosen on the basis of shares of national income as well as the authors’ best empirical 
judgment. 
10 The real (inflation-adjusted) discount factor is estimated by dividing 1 plus the 10 percent average pre-tax rate of 
return to capital by 1 plus the 3 percent rate of inflation. The real discount rate is this discount factor minus 1 
(.06796 = [(1 + 0.10)/(1 + 0.03)] − 1). 
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Results 
After running the 15 stylized households under the three tax scenarios (45 cases total), we 
calculate the present value of the households’ remaining lifetime resources, remaining lifetime 
spending, and remaining lifetime taxes (including imputed corporate taxes because individuals 
ultimately bear the full burden of corporate taxes, income taxes, and FICA taxes). These results 
are displayed in tables 3–5. 
Remaining lifetime resources include the value of existing assets, the present value of all 
future labor earnings, and the present value of future retirement account withdrawals net of 
contributions to these accounts. Remaining lifetime spending references the present value of all 
future spending, both discretionary and nondiscretionary (e.g., paying off a mortgage). Total 
lifetime taxes include the present value of all personal taxes and imputed corporate taxes. It is 
generally understood by economists that employees absorb both the employee and employer 
portions of FICA taxes. Because ESPlanner presents just the employee-paid taxes, FICA taxes 
are doubled and presented in present value. 
ESPlanner presents all results in today’s real dollars. We discount each household’s 
annual real taxes at the pre-tax real rate of return. The real discount rate is 6.796 percent: 
[(1.10/1.03) − 1]. 
 
Effects of Closing the Fiscal Gap 
Closing the fiscal gap through tax increases has different effects on the lifetime tax burden of the 
rich, the poor, the old, the young, and the middle class. There are two ways to look at the 
distributional effects of a tax policy change: within generations and across generations. 
	   13 
Intergenerational tax comparisons (comparisons across two generations) are problematic 
when tax structures change based on age. For instance, a government that taxes the young, 
working generation and not the old, retired generation could appear, in intergenerational 
comparisons, to be regressive. The poor, young people pay taxes while the old individuals, who 
have accumulated wealth, appear not to be taxed at all. Although a possible inference from this 
intergenerational comparison is that the tax structure is regressive, the comparison provides very 
little information without summing the total lifetime tax burdens. Such apples-to-oranges 
comparisons are often misleading and rarely insightful. 
Table 2 illustrates each stylized family’s change in the lifetime tax rate when moving 
from the EFT to the new higher rate. (Figure 1, on page 19, is a similar visual representation of 
each cohort’s total lifetime tax rate in each income bracket and under each tax plan.) Table 2 
shows that in all 45 cases, the change in the tax share of total lifetime resources is positive—a 
tax hike increases everyone’s lifetime tax rate. The following analysis looks at the relative 
intragenerational (within the same generation) size of the change in lifetime tax rates. 
Closing the fiscal gap with an immediate and permanent 57 percent tax increase for 30-
year-olds results in an increase in lifetime tax rates of 7 percentage points for those making 
$12,500 a year. Similar increases in lifetime tax rates are shown for each cohort: a 15 percentage 
point increase for those making $50,000 annually, a 19 percentage point increase for those 
making $250,000 annually, a 23 percentage point increase for those making $1 million annually, 
and a 15 percentage point increase for those with $25 million in assets. The largest lifetime tax 
rate increases affect 30-year-olds earning $250,000 and $1 million a year. The individuals with 
$25 million in assets pay relatively less. 
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Table 2. Change in Tax Share of Lifetime Resources under Immediate 57% 
Tax Increase and Delayed 69% Tax Increase 
Income/assets	   30-­‐year-­‐olds	   45-­‐year-­‐olds	   60-­‐year-­‐olds	  
$12,500	  under	  57%	  increase	   7%	   11%	   6%	  
$12,500	  under	  69%	  increase	  in	  2034	   7%	   2%	   1%	  
$50,000	  under	  57%	  increase	   15%	   11%	   9%	  
$50,000	  under	  69%	  increase	  in	  2034	   12%	   1%	   1%	  
$250,000	  under	  57%	  increase	   19%	   17%	   15%	  
$250,000	  under	  69%	  increase	  in	  2034	   10%	   5%	   4%	  
$1	  million	  under	  57%	  increase	   23%	   20%	   16%	  
$1	  million	  under	  69%	  increase	  in	  2034	   15%	   7%	   4%	  
$25	  million	  assets	  under	  57%	  increase	   15%	   13%	   13%	  
$25	  million	  assets	  under	  69%	  increase	  in	  2034	   9%	   6%	   4%	  
 
Tax increases for the 45- and 60-year-olds follow a similar pattern. Under the immediate 
and permanent 57 percent increase, everyone’s tax share of revenue increases. Generally 
speaking, the older generations’ tax burden does not increase as much as the younger 
generation’s tax burden. This is not necessarily a function of distributional inequality going 
forward. Instead, it is a function of the timing of the tax increase and life’s labor and 
consumption patterns. 
Implementation of the delayed and permanent 69 percent tax increase offers the 
opportunity to visualize the degree to which timing affects who will pay for the fiscal gap. In 
2034, when the delayed tax increase takes effect, our three modeled cohorts will all have 20 
fewer years to pay the higher tax rates: the 30-year-olds will be 51 years old, the 45-year-olds 
will be 66 years old, and the 60-year-olds will be 81 years old. Fewer years paying the high tax 
rates result in a less dramatic change in lifetime tax rates. The unmodeled consequence of not 
immediately addressing the fiscal gap will be the increased tax burden placed on the children of 
our model cohorts. 
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Tables 3–5 (pages 20–22) show the present value of total remaining lifetime resources, 
spending, and taxes (including imputed corporate taxes, income taxes, and FICA taxes). These 
tables clearly show that higher tax rates mean higher lifetime taxes paid, which also mean 
lifetime spending must decrease. Even the lowest income brackets that receive subsidies 
(negative income taxes) are harmed by tax hikes. 
Unfortunately, the delayed tax increase is the most likely future scenario for two reasons. 
First, the fiscal gap is systematically misrepresented by $197 trillion in popular political culture. 
This reduces the perceived urgency to act. Second, the numbers presented in table 2 show that, if 
delay continues, fewer reductions will fall on current voters’ lifetime spending ability. The 
generational effect is exacerbated by the fact that older cohorts have more political power. 
Beginning in 2034, every subsequent generation will be subject to the 69 percent higher tax rate. 
The longer Congress waits, the more draconian the tax increase will need to be. 
It may seem obvious to some individuals that increasing across-the-board tax rates will 
increase taxes paid and diminish lifetime spending, negatively impacting individual welfare. 
However, there is still a popular narrative that increased taxes will solve our fiscal woes without 
placing an undue burden on taxpayers. In this light, the total dollar figures presented in tables 
3–5 are striking. A household with two 30-year-old working parents that makes $250,000 a year 
will have almost $700,000 less to spend, in today’s dollars, over the couple’s lifetime. Even a 
family making $50,000 will have its lifetime spending lowered by more than a full year’s 
salary. These projections help illustrate the tangible effects that the fiscal gap will have on 
working Americans. 
Closing the fiscal gap with tax increases alone may not be politically feasible. But it is 
still helpful to show what such an extreme proposal would mean for different households in 
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different cohorts of different means. This paper models an across-the-board tax increase, 
ignoring macroeconomic feedback effects on growth. However, it is well established that 
intergenerational redistribution can have dramatic negative impacts on an economy’s economic 
transition.11 Such general equilibrium feedback effects would make requisite tax hikes higher, 
even if not much higher than those considered here. They also may render tax hikes, by 
themselves, unable to close the fiscal gap. 
 
Conclusion 
The US government has spent decades “taxing” current generations while also writing them huge 
IOUs for future benefits. Today, the fiscal gap separating spending commitments and the taxes 
projected to cover these commitments is immense. The burden on the individuals left to pick up 
the tab grows larger with each passing year of congressional and presidential inaction. 
This paper examines the impact of both immediate and delayed tax hikes that would 
smoothly close the fiscal gap on five stylized households in three different cohorts. Raising the 
federal tax rate on all households, and all age and resource levels, increases each family’s 
lifetime tax rate and decreases its lifetime spending. The results show that delaying the tax 
increase lowers the burden on those now alive, particularly the elderly. But this delay just shifts a 
larger burden onto unrepresented future generations. 
This general point is well known. This paper further shows that uniform tax increases 
will raise lifetime tax rates of American households to very different degrees depending on 
their ages, levels of resources, and composition of resources as between future labor earnings 
and assets. 
                                                
11 See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for a full discussion of the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on capital 
formation, economic growth, and intergenerational equity. 
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If the fiscal gap was closed immediately with tax increases, working households earning 
$1 million a year would see their average remaining lifetime tax rate rise by 23 percentage 
points, if they are 30 years old; by 20 percentage points, if they are 45 years old; and by 16 
percentage points, if they are 60 years old. For working households earning just $12,500 a year, 
the comparable increases are 7 percentage points, 11 percentage points, and 6 percentage points. 
Waiting to close the gap will result in even higher taxes. 
Taxes are not the only way to close the fiscal gap. In reality, it will take some 
combination of both tax increases and spending cuts to address the burgeoning debt. Some 
examples of workable policy prescriptions can be found at www.thepurpleplans.org. The Purple 
Plans provide examples of different ways to eliminate the fiscal gap, while stimulating economic 
growth and lessening the economic fallout of physical readjustment. 
No adjustment that sufficiently addresses the fiscal gap will be small. Even a 6 percent 
tax hike could materially reduce a household’s welfare. Furthermore, the figures in this study, 
which assume an immediate and permanent 57 percent increase in all federal taxes, would be 
larger still if the tax adjustment is deferred. 
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